



Partisan warfare, fragmented institutions, and market
challenges continue to shape the rollout of Obamacare
Though passed by Congress in 2010, the Affordable Care Act, also known as ‘Obamacare’ only
came into place towards the end of 2013. The initial months of the program have been
characterized by a litany of IT failures for the healthcare.gov website, and concern over gaps in
health insurance coverage. Daniel Béland, Philip Rocco, and Alex Waddan write that while the
debate over Obamacare is no longer about its repeal, its supporters and opponents still face
battles over how it is instituted. They argue that Republican states are using their legislative
capacity to thwart the law, which may give Democrats the opportunity to place blame on them for
coverage gaps.
Since it took off in 2010, the Affordable Care Act (ACA) has been flying through turbulent skies. In
the past three years, House Republicans have launched 47 attempts to repeal the law, and have
plans now to offer alternatives to it. The rollout of both federal and state online health-insurance
marketplaces was widely perceived as problematic. And in the states, many Republican officials
have actively attempted to obstruct the law, all while enrollment in federally facilitated
marketplace plans has steadily increased (see Figure 1).
Figure 1 – Increasing Enrollment in Federally Facilitated Plans
In this context, ideological closure has reigned supreme. Supporters of the law believe it will emerge through
these minefields unscathed. Opponents believe that the botched early rollout will ultimately doom the law,
especially if a Republican presidential candidate emerges victorious in 2016. Both of these viewpoints, however,
misapprehend the larger set of challenges and opportunities that policy elites on both sides of the aisle are facing.
As our research shows, the battle over the ACA is no longer about repeal. Rather, supporters and opponents of
reform are now using the ACA’s institutional terrain as a site for new political contests, such as renegotiating the
administration of Medicaid and establishing new insurance market regulations. So the relevant question is: how
will the ACA evolve over time? The answer to this question depends on how the law’s supporters respond and
adapt to outstanding policy problems in a context of institutional fragmentation, demands for high-quality service
to be delivered under budget and without error, and a polarized environment in Washington, which is making
normal updates to the ACA (key to the early life of public policies) difficult to ratify, and sloughing off critical policy
decisions to states with partisan monopolies.
The importance of institutional fragmentation
Thus far, the implementation of ACA has taken place in a context of political conflict similar to the one that led to its
enactment in March 2010. But what makes the divide between Democrats and Republicans so influential as far
as implementation is concerned is the law’s intergovernmental structure, which allocates key policy authority to
both federal and state actors. From this perspective, the law has strongly complicated the rolling out of health-
insurance exchanges as well as the expansion of Medicaid benefits by permitting state political leaders opposed
to the law to refuse to cooperate in its rollout. The June 2012 Supreme Court decision allowing states to opt out of
this expansion without penalty also facilitated institutional opposition to ACA implementation in Republican-
controlled states.
Although states have strong fiscal incentives to participate in this expansion, Republican opposition to the ACA is
so strong in most GOP-controlled states that opting-out of Medicaid expansion and state-controlled marketplaces
became the dominant policy option, with a few notable exceptions. Because of the law’s design, opt-outs could be
highly visible political decisions, taken in legislatures and in governor’s offices. In contrast, the institutional design
of the ACA regulatory reforms affecting insurance markets have not been as controversial and politically
contentious, for the most part. This is the case because, considering their distinct institutional design, these
regulatory changes have a lower level of political salience, which makes them less likely to become central
elements of the political showoff over ACA than the health insurance exchanges and the proposed Medicaid
expansion (on this see our forthcoming article in Health Policy).
As the law continues to evolve, governors and federal administrators in support of the law will attempt to find ways
to remove core implementation issues from direct political disputes. By contrast, opponents who still see cutting
down “Obamacare” as a winning issue will try to make large political fights out of mundane administrative issues.
As long as the ACA remains a strong campaign issue for Republicans, Democrats may seek a quieter, more
obscure path to promoting the ACA’s implementation across jurisdictional boundaries, working with state Medicaid
directors and insurance commissioners to forge “middle-road” solutions to improve the quality and cost of health
coverage.
The evolving challenges of service delivery
Whereas institutional fragmentation and polarization may seem like the same old story of contemporary American
politics, there is much that is new with the ACA, and much that is new can add to policy turbulence. The recent
rollout of the federal website healthcare.gov was widely criticized, with blame frequently targeted on incompetent
bureaucrats. However, our ongoing research suggests that three deeper institutional and market patterns are
responsible for the problems that emerged and the degree of negativity that those problems generated.
First, public expectations of what service delivery should be like have increased, and there is little tolerance for
policy implementation through trial and error. Recent polling data suggest that now, more than ever, citizens
demand that government provide programs that contain client-customized performance, which healthcare.gov
attempted to achieve.
Second, demand for high quality service comes against a background of public sector austerity that has made it
more difficult for government to function effectively at many levels, but especially when the task at hand is to
oversee major new public policy innovation. In addition, the use of private sector providers, especially on the IT
side, exaggerates the difficulty of effective oversight. These issues were exacerbated with regard to the ACA by
the manner in which much of the planning for roll out of the exchanges was done under the political radar with
inadequate resources.
Third, bureaucrats increasingly operate in a culture that demands performance and damns apparent mistakes,
especially when the political stakes are high and opponents of policy initiatives are champing at the bit in
anticipation of any implementation problems that they might highlight. One consequence of this pattern is to make
those bureaucrats even more unwilling to admit to problems when they emerge. Certainly with the ACA, there is
evidence that there was an unwillingness to acknowledge the evidence of likely problems with the federal
exchange marketplace being designed for those states who had chosen not to develop their own exchange.
The direction the ACA takes in the future will have much to do with how government responds to these patterns. If
budgets are increasingly constrained, and if tolerance for error remains low, the HHS may have little slack to do
the kind of innovations necessary to keep pace with increasing client demands.
The persistence of polarization and a two-sided policy regime  in the States
Looking ahead, persistent polarization in Congress and an increasingly cash-strapped federal bureaucracy make
it difficult to see how Washington alone can be responsive to problems of health-care quality, cost and
accessibility. What’s more, there may be real limits to what Washington can do about policy problems like the
“coverage gap” caused by many states’ failure to expand the Medicaid program. In short, the future of ACA may
depend on state governments’ ability to respond to consumer demands about the cost and quality of coverage.
Our working paper on state-level health insurance policy suggests, however, that the ACA’s evolution may be
heavily bifurcated. When we look at the level of state legislative activity and characteristics of state legislative
enactments, we see two divergent policy regimes. States led by the Democratic Party are significantly more likely
to become “co-producers” of policy, investing in legislative activity on health reform and the development of policy
expertise, while states controlled by Republicans are using their legislative capacity to stir dissent and to thwart
the core goals of the law. For instance, whereas California is currently pursuing legislative and ballot initiatives to
clamp down on unreasonable rate increases and to control prices, states like Missouri are passing bills like the
“Big Government Get Off My Back Act ”, which do much to assuage political opposition to the ACA but little to
address the concerns of consumers in the marketplace.
For the near term, the divergence does not appear to be letting up, especially given political polarization in the
states. This suggests that the “diffusion” of health policies from Democratic to Republican states will stall out,
especially if Republican states can continue to credibly claim that the problems with the ACA are the fault of the
federal government, not the states. However, as enrollment in the exchanges ticks up, and more citizens find
themselves in the coverage gap, Democrats may be able to successfully pin the blame on recalcitrant governors
and state legislatures for failing to take up the reins on issues like the accessibility, cost, and quality of health
coverage. Such a campaign would remain challenging to coordinate across so many states, but if Democrats
hope to achieve policy convergence, it would be a challenge well worth accepting.
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